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A Call for Comparative Research: 
Consequences of a Rising Income Inequality for State Activities 
 
The aim of this discussion paper is not only to activate a debate over the interrelation 
between rising income inequality and economic policy measures but also to initiate 
comparative research in several European countries and North America. It discusses the 
consequences of a rising income inequality and its implications for state activities and 
economic policy. Using a simple model it becomes evident that an increasing income 
inequality leads to higher government spending, as a share of Gross Domestic Product, 
though the state does not take over more responsibilities. It also leads to a higher tax share 
though rates of taxation are not increased. This forces economic politicians to act. If they 
want to prevent an increase of these shares in order not to fall behind in the international 
competition, they must accept a rising public debt and/or must move away from socially 
accepted value judgments about “social standards”, the degree of redistribution by taxes 
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A Call for Comparative Research – Consequences of a Rising Income 
Inequality for State Activities  
In many OECD-countries a rising income concentration could be – and can be – ob-
served and has been discussed widely (e.g. OECD, 2008; International Monetary Fund, 
2007; Berthold, 2007, Krämer, 2005; Atkinson, 2003, Alderson and Nelsen, 2002, 
Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997). After the Second World War the distribution of in-
comes had become more equal at first, but since the early to mid-1970s a long-lasting 
rise in income inequality started. Therefore Harrison and Bluestone (1988) refer to the 
"great u-turn" (though Gustafsson and Johansson, (1999) contradict this concept). First, 
a rising income concentration is proven by a considerable decrease in wage ratios indi-
cating a redistribution from earners of wage incomes to proprietors of capital. Second, 
differences in earned incomes increased as incomes at the top "exploded" while medium 
incomes grew moderately and low incomes nearly stagnated. 
On the contrary, it was hardly discussed what are the implications of an increased in-
come inequality would be for state activities and for the strategical options of economic 
policy and hence for the attitude towards politics of citizens (and voters).  
The object of this paper is not only to activate a debate over the interrelation between 
rising income inequality and economic policy measures but also to initiate comparative 
research in several European countries and North America. We would especially like to 
draw attention to the following questions: 
–  Does a considerable increase of income inequality lead to less redistribution of mar-
ket incomes by the government and furthermore to a lower amount of basic social 
care (lower "social standards")?   and  
  Does a higher income concentration cause a lower supply with public goods? 
–  Do citizens accept, in this context, that politicians move away from previous, socially 
accepted value judgements?  
The plan of our short discussion paper is as follows: In Section 1 the implications of 
rising income inequality for taxes, transfer payments and government spending, as a 
share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), are demonstrated with a simple model. Sec-
tion 2 discusses why this puts (economic) politicians under the obligation to act and 
which options of reaction they have. Section 3 concludes with an outlook on further re-
search, determining which empirical investigations would be interesting for different 
countries, and is simultaneously a call for comparative research. 
1.  A simple model  
We have designed a simple theoretical approach to demonstrate the effects of rising 
income inequality on public revenue and public spending, assuming: 
A country’s income distribution can be characterized by the average income of in-
come earners below the median (
_
1 Y ) and above the median (
_
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Accordingly, the average income in the economy is:    
(3)   , 
and the total income amounts to: 
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We speak of a concentration of the income distribution if the total income (Y) re-
mains constant while the income in the upper half (Y2) increases and the income in the 
lower half (Y1) decreases and hence the following equation applies:    
(5) 
1 2 Y Y ∆ − = ∆ . 
Thereby we assume, which is of course a simplification, that the income distribution 
within both halves does not change, i.e. all Yi , for which applies i ≤ n/2, decrease by the 
same percentage and all Yi , for which applies i > n/2, increase by the same percentage. 
The system of taxation only consists of an income tax and earners of both income 
groups are taxed with a unitary rate t1 and t2 respectively. (There is no tax-free amount.) 
There is a simple system of transfer payments: Earners with an income falling below 
a certain minimum income (Ymin) get transfer payments. Accordingly, public spending 
for transfer payments (Tr) adds up to:  
(6)  i min i min Tr
n
1 i
Tr Y Y for Y Y Y with Y tr Tr
i i > − = ⋅ = ∑
=
 
      and   i min Tr Y Y for 0 Y
i ≤ =  
     Tr Y tr⋅ =  . 
(In the equation tr is the transfer rate,  i Tr Y  is the assessment basis for the transfer 
payment of the ith income earner and YTr is the macroeconomic assessment ba-
sis.) 
Public revenue equal tax revenue (T) amounting to: 
(7)  2 2 1 1 Y t Y t T ⋅ + ⋅ =  . 
Public spending (G) includes transfer payments (Tr) and spending for public con-
sumption (CG) and for public investment (IG): 
(8)  . I C Tr G G G + + =  
In the initial situation the budget is balanced, i.e. the following equation is met: 
(9)   . I C Tr G T G G + + = =   
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Thereby the following factors are the result of social value judgements in a country:  
–  The transfer rate tr and the minimum income Ymin , below which an individual gets 
transfer payments. (For tr = 1, all lower market incomes add up to Ymin .) 
–  Public spending for consumption and for investment. These mirror which duties and 
responsibilities the government should take and which supply with public goods is 
seen as "adequate".  
–  The tax rates t1 and t2. They reflect how much the citizens should pay for public 
goods and to what degree incomes should be redistributed. 
Implications of rising income inequality for state activities 
If Y2/Y1 increases, while the total income Y is remaining unchanged we interpret this 
as a higher concentration of the income distribution. In that case 
1 2 Y Y ∆ − = ∆  applies.  
This has – ceteris paribus – far-reaching consequences for government revenue and 
spending and hence for state activities:  
–  Tax revenue increases by   
(10)   2 1 2 1 1 2 2 Y ) t t ( Y t Y t T ∆ ⋅ − = ∆ ⋅ + ∆ ⋅ = ∆   (as ∆Y2 = – ∆Y1). 
  This leads to a higher tax share T/Y – though rates of taxation are not increased.  
–  Transfer payments rise by  
(11)   Tr Y tr Tr ∆ ⋅ = ∆   . 
(The assessment basis for transfer payments increases if the concentration of the in-
come distribution rises. One reason is that more income earners get transfer pay-
ments, the other reason is that previous transfer recipients get higher payments.) 
  The result is a higher share of transfer payments Tr/Y – though the transfer rate and  
  the income below which individuals qualify for transfers Ymin remain unchanged.  
Note that it would be mere chance, if ∆T would equal ∆Tr as both values are influ-
enced by different factors:   
–  The increase of the taxes ∆T depends on the two tax rates t1 and t2 and on the degree 
of income redistribution –∆Y1 = ∆Y2 .  
–  The growth of the transfer payments ∆Tr is influenced by the transfer rate tr and the 
rise of the assessment basis for the transfer payment  Tr Y ∆  which again, depends on 
the extent of redistribution between the two groups of income earners and on the 
(unchanged) income distribution within the lower half of earners.  
Nevertheless, for the sake of transparency of our argument, we assume: 
(12)  ∆T = ∆Tr = ∆G and ∆T/Y = ∆Tr/Y = ∆G/Y respectively. 
This simple model only serves the purpose of demonstrating the essential problem. It 
cannot be used to predict how taxes, transfer payments and government spending, as a  
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share of GDP, will increase in a specific economy if the income inequality rises by a 
definite extent. 
This will be the result of a multitude of country-specific institutional rules. The sys-
tem of taxation, for example, is of particular importance, especially the share of indirect 
taxes of tax revenue, the form of progressive taxation and tax exemptions. Furthermore, 
the form and amounts of social welfare and the preconditions for drawing benefits are 
relevant. Accordingly different macroeconomic models are required for the simulation 
of the effects of a rising income inequality on the shares of taxes, transfer payments and 
government expenditures in different economies.  
2.  "Strategical Options" of Economic Policy 
Which options do politicians have to respond to an increase of the tax burden and 
higher public spending, as a share of economic output? Which "scenarios" are possible 
and in which way do they "force" politicians to move away from previous value judge-
ments concerning redistribution, duties and responsibilities of the government and "so-
cial standards"? 
One can imagine four "scenarios": 
(1) Politicians hold fast to previous value judgements. Accordingly, they do not change 
tax rates, quantity and quality of public goods and the system of transfer payments. 
In that case they have to accept that the tax share and the share of transfer payments 
in GDP increase and hence the share of government spending goes up.  
(2)  Fearing that the international competitiveness of the economy could deteriorate, 
economic politicians decrease tax rates (or broaden tax exemptions) until the tax 
share of the economy reaches its old level. (The background is that macroeconomic 
key figures, like tax shares in GDP, are often used for international comparisons and 
for measuring competitiveness.) These tax cuts lead to less redistribution though the 
concentration of market incomes has increased. Furthermore, they cause a budget 
deficit and hence a rising public debt (as transfer payments remain on their higher 
level).  
The increasing public debt puts politicians under the obligation to act because rising 
government spending is often interpreted as a sign of the increasingly "exorbitant" de-
mands of the state (Plickert, 2007). Moreover, the increase of the tax ratio is often 
equated with a loss of international competitiveness. Therefore politicians do not only 
aim at the old tax share but also at the old share of government spending in GDP, which 
leads to the third and forth scenario:  
(3) If politicians do not lower "social standards", the increased share of transfer pay-
ments in GDP implies a reduction of government expenditures for consumption and 
investment. This deteriorates the supply with public goods, i.e. it interferes with the 
needs of a modern educational system, a well functioning infrastructure and an effi-
cient public administration including high public safety.  
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(4) The alternative way for economic politicians is to "downsize" social benefits, espe-
cially to pay less social welfare and to reduce contributions to (public) health care 
and pension schemes. 
  (Another possibility is combining a reduction of public spending for consumption 
and investment and a decrease of "social standards".) 
Table 1: "Scenarios" for Economic Policy in Case of Rising Income Inequality 
Table 1 gives an overview of politicians’ options in handling the implications of a 
rising income concentration. They either have to ignore the criticism that a higher tax 
share in GDP and higher government expenditures indicate a lower international com-
petitiveness and "exorbitant" demands of the state, or they have to diverge from estab-
lished value judgements in the society.   
In most countries a rising concentration of market incomes will induce economic 
politicians to say good-bye to existing and accepted value judgements about an "ade-
quate" supply with public goods, redistribution and "social standards". However, if the 
citizens (and voters) hold on to their value judgements and politicians refuse to follow 
these, this might result in disenchantment with politics. 
3.  Research outlook  
The aim of our short discussion paper is to initiate comparative research in several 
European countries and North America about the development of the income distribu-
tion and its implications for state activities.  
–  The starting point is the question if and how much the income distribution in the in-
vestigated countries changed. This requires an agreement on how to measure income 
inequality and its change, i.e. similar statistical metrics have to be used. 
–  In order to investigate how much the observed rise of the income concentration 
would have increased the share of transfer payments and the share of taxes in GDP 
ceteris paribus (i.e. without any change of tax system; system of transfer payments 
and supply of public goods) macroeconometric models are necessary. These country-
specific models "mirror" different institutions and institutional rules. On this basis 
the differing effects of a rising income concentration can be simulated. 
–  Against this background researchers should focus on the question, which options the 
different politicians chose if the income inequality in their country increased. Did 
they accept an increase of the tax share, the share of transfer payments and the share 
of government spending in GDP or did they diverge from value judgements concern-
ing redistribution, "social standards" and/or an "adequate" supply with public goods? 
– Especially  from  a  political  point of view, it is interesting to investigate whether the 
citizens and voters of the different countries have accepted these changes of value 
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Table 1: "Scenarios" for Economic Policy in Case of a Rising Income Inequality 
  TGT r C G+IG  
•  Initial situation        T = G  Balanced budget (assumption) 
•  Consequences of a rising income inequality  Changes compared to 
the initial situation 
 
1. Adhering to previous (socially accepted) value judgements 
about "social standards", the degree of redistribution by taxes 
and an "adequate" supply with public goods. 
↑ ↑ ↑ o  T = G  (simplifying assumption) 
Taxes, transfer payments and government expenditure,  
as well as share of GDP, increase, whereas government ex-
penditures for consumption and investment remain un-
changed. 
2. Decreasing tax rates (and redistribution) to return to the pre-
vious tax share in GDP for "regaining" international competi-
tiveness (otherwise value judgements are maintained). 
o ↑ ↑ o  T < G, i.e. a budget deficit leads to a higher public debt. 
The tax share remains unchanged, whereas transfer payments 
and government spending, as share of GDP, increase. 
Returning to previous tax share and government spending share 
in GDP keeping international competitiveness and balanced 
budget in view. 
oo    T = G, i.e. balanced budget, by reverting to the tax share 
and government spending share in GDP in the initial situation. 
3. Adhering to value judgements concerning "social standards" 
implies a reduction of government expenditures for consump-
tion and investment.  
oo↑ ↓  –  The increased share of transfer payments "forces" the  
    government to spend less for consumption and investment. 
or 
4 Adhering to value judgements concerning an "adequate"  
supply with public goods implies a decrease of "social stan-
dards" (so that transfer payments do not increase, except 
for the fact that income inequality has risen). 
ooo o  
or 
–  If the government wants to return to the share of transfer  
    payments in GDP in the initial situation it "is forced" to  
    decrease the "social standards".  
or 
A combination of a reduction of public expenditures for con-








–  To reach a moderately increased share of transfer pay- 
    ments the government "is forced" to decrease "social stan- 
    dards"and to spend less for consumption and investment. 